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GRAEME S. MOUNT

MAINE AND THE END OF RECIPROCITY IN 1866

Portland’s development in the nineteenth century owed
much to the economic strategies adopted by its leading mer
chants and politicians. In the prosperous years following
statehood, the city benefited enormously from the burgeoning
West Indies trade. By midcentury the coastwise exchange of
timber, rum, and sugar had tapered off, and the city looked to
new methods for m aintaining its commercial strength. Build
ing on Portland’s mercantile heritage, city leaders turned to
railroads, and especially rail links with Canada, as a means to
continue the flow of trade through the city. Continental eco
nomic integration — stronger trade links between Canada and
the northeastern United States — promised new returns on
Portland’s traditional commercial advantages.
The key to linking Canadian trade to Portland’s port
facilities was the Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railroad, officially
opened on July 18,1853. The new line, which joined Montreal
and Portland, resulted from the entrepreneurial and promo
tional energies of Portland’s John Alfred Poor, W illiam Pitt
Preble, and Josiah S. Little and those of Montreal businessman
Alexander T illoch Galt. The railroad’s promoters had high
lighted the advantages for both cities. Since the St. Lawrence
River was clogged by ice for roughly half of each year, the
railroad offered Montreal an alternative to winter isolation; the
terminus at Portland would be the western city’s outlet to the
rest of the world. For Montreal, Portland was closer by half a
day to Great Britain than Boston, and two days nearer than
New York. As the railroad became an important part of the
Portland economy, Montreal could hope to exert more influ
ence in Portland than in larger Boston or New York. As for
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Portland's grow th in the nineteenth century reflected its changing commercial advantages.
As transportation moved from sailing ships to steam and finally railroads, c ity leaders
adopted strategies that kept Portland at the center of regional trade flows. Trade with Canada
was an im portant part of their response. Maine Historical Society (MHS) photo.

Portland, located as it was on the periphery of major United
States trade flows, its proximity to the Canadian heartland was
an appealing opportunity for growth.
Government and business found the money and built the
line. Three weeks after the opening, Canada’s Grand Trunk
Railway leased the American portion, known as the Atlantic
and St. Lawrence Railroad, for 999 years. Stability seemed
assured.1 Indeed, over the next ten years Portland boomed
because of the connection. Between 1850 and 1860 Portland’s
population increased from 21,000 to 26,000. The twenty-fifth
largest city in the United States before 1853, Portland became
the twenty-third.2 By one estimate, in 1864 alone more than
500,000 barrels of Canadian flour and 1,000,000 bushels of
wheat left Canada for trans-Atlantic markets via Portland. The
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transshipment business, which involved a variety of subsidiary
activities such as the maintenance of grain elevators, port facili
ties, and commercial establishments, was a tremendous boon to
the local economy.3
The impact of the new rail line demonstrated to Portland
leaders that continental economic integration was the key to
the city’s commercial future. For J. A. Poor, the Atlantic and St.
Lawrence was only a beginning. His much more daring plan
for a second railroad, the European and North American,
called for a line running east from Portland through New
Brunswick, peninsular Nova Scotia, and perhaps Cape Breton
Island, enabling travelers to shave additional days off their
trans-Atlantic crossings. Given better rail links between Maine
and Canada, geography could once again work to Portland’s
advantage.

T he commercial and railroad history of Portland, how
ever, highlights a curious inconsistency in Maine politics in
the second half of the nineteenth century. Given the impor
tance of the Canadian connection to Maine’s largest urban
community, one m ight reasonably look for strong political
support in Maine for diplomatic ties binding the two nations
more securely. Such support, however, was not to be found. In
fact, key politicians from Maine were vocal in their opposition
to the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 and were indifferent to the
possibility that its abrogation in 1866 m ight stimulate British
North Americans into greater commercial self-reliance at
Portland’s expense. The Reciprocity Treaty, concluded June 5,
1854, between Secretary of State W illiam Marcy and Lord
Elgin, Governor-General of British North America, eliminated
tariffs on products of farms, forests, fisheries, and mines as they
crossed the boundary between British North America and the
United States. It allowed United States citizens and British
North Americans freer access to each other’s fisheries and water
arteries.4 The purpose of this article is to explain why many
Maine politicians wanted an end to reciprocity in spite of its
seeming importance to the state’s key commercial port.
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Com pletion of the Atlantic and St. Lawrence Railroad, linking Montreal and
Portland, brought a flury of activity to the Forest City. Construction of new
shipping facilities continued to change the Portland cityscape into the twen
tieth century, as this early scene shows. MSH photo.

What exactly did reciprocity offer to Maine’s economy?
Continental economic integration unquestionably did prom
ise benefits, and historians have argued that, directly or indi
rectly, abrogation in 1866 was indeed harmful to the interests of
people in Maine. In particular, abrogation added fuel to the
movement for Confederation, which followed less than sixteen
months after the reciprocity agreements ended. Writing in
1926, railroad historian Edward Chase argued that without
Confederation Canadians would not have organized the Cana
dian Pacific Railway, which bypassed Portland as Canada's
Atlantic port. Given Portland's proximity to Montreal, Chase
was convinced that on economic grounds Portland should have
been the CPR’s Atlantic terminus. For political reasons alone,
the CPR went to Saint John, New Brunswick, instead.5A later
treatment of the reciprocity question pointed out that abroga
tion “became a decided disadvantage” to the line between
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Montreal and Portland.6 Passports, required of anyone cross
ing the boundary after the St. Albans raid of November 1864,
were so costly that Canadians stopped coming, and the Grand
Trunk Railway was forced to cancel passenger trains. Passport
requirements may have had an indirect impact on the volume
of Canadian freight passing through Portland as w ell.7
Michael Sheehy, another student of Portland history, summar
ized that “inim ical relations” between the British Empire and
the United States were hardly in the interests of Portland’s
development as a railroad center.8
Other historians have argued at length that reciprocity was
good for the entire state. Maine needed coal, which could be
supplied from Nova Scotia more economically than from
Pennsylvania. Wages in Nova Scotia were lower than in
Pennsylvania, and Nova Scotia was closer to Maine. Local
industries also needed specialty lumber, flaxseed, building
stone, and fine wool that could be shipped from British North
America. Maine was far from American sources of these
commodities.9
Such arguments were obvious at least to some in the years
that saw a nationwide debate over reciprocity. In 1864-1865,
John A. Poor still hoped to make Portland part of the Canadian
transportation system. His European and North American
Railroad, stalled for the moment at Bangor, would never reach
Saint John and Halifax, he feared, without stronger continen
tal integration. He had supported reciprocity from the begin
ning, and he continued to support it throughout the 1860s. At
the request of Portland’s Board of Trade, Poor petitioned Con
gress to renew the agreement despite the St. Albans raid. An
economic adviser to Republican Governor Joshua L. Cham
berlain from 1867 to 1871, Poor gained support from that
quarter. He and Chamberlain were political pragmatists, well
aware of the benefits flow ing from continental integration.10
Even opponents of reciprocity, such as Maine Senator Lot M.
Morrill, admitted that Maine’s railroad interests had benefited
from the treaty, although he gambled that there would be no
serious setbacks after the treaty’s demise.11
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John A. Poor, lawyer, rail
road entrepreneur, and
ardent supporter of
Canadian-American reci
procity. Photo couresy
MIIS.

I'he meaning of reciprocity for Maine in general was
apparent in the coalition of economic groups that supported
continental economic integration. Lumbermen along Maine’s
boundary rivers, the St. John, the Aroostook, and the St. Croix,
benefited from cooperation with New Brunswick. Although
the lumbeimen on these rivers enjoyed special international
trading privileges that predated, in some cases, the Reciprocity
Treaty, they reasoned that any disruption of existing relations
between the two nations could complicate their marketing
situation.12Shipbuilders too benefited. As early as 1854. Maine
Senator William Pitt Fessenden pointed out that Maine’s
forests were finite, and that Canadian trees could prolong the
life of the shipbuilding industry after specialty timber had been
depleted in Maine.13 Reciprocity also permitted Maine’s
fishermen greater access to the fishing grounds off British
North America.14 There were ideological arguments for reci
procity as well. Governor Chamberlain, for instance, main
tained that free trade promoted economic efficiency. “It seems
unwise," he said, “to cramp energy with taxes and duties.’’15
hy, then, did so many of Maine's officeholders oppose
reciprocity, despite the economic benefits it offered Portland
and other sectors of the economy? The answer lies in the balanceof economic forces in the state. Abrogation sentiment was
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more than a sim ple miscalculation; Maine politicians, pres
sured by powerful lobbies representing major economic
groups, were torn between competing economic interests in
this complex and somewhat murky issue. During Maine’s
debate over continental integration, Portland’s long-term
interests were neither clearly defined nor forcefully argued, and
this would have a telling effect on the city’s economy by the end
of the century.
Several important economic interests were at odds with
Portland’s business community on the issue of continental
economic integration. Even though the Reciprocity Treaty
provided access to rich Canadian fishing grounds, Maine’s
fishermen, then, as now, did not want to compete w ith fisher
men from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland in
the United States market, as required by the terms of reciproc
ity.16 Historians have also emphasized the importance of the
lumber lobby. As far as Bangor’s lumber community was con
cerned, reciprocity was n o th in g less than a recipe for
unemploym ent.17The Penobscot and Kennebec lumber indus
tries suffered a setback during the years reciprocity was in effect,
and it is hardly surprising that, right or wrong, lumbermen in
Bangor and Augusta saw a casual connection. As late as 1870,
Representative James G. Blaine successfully used the reciproc
ity issue to defeat Chamberlain’s bid for one of Maine’s Senate
seats. Writing his friend Hannibal Hamlin, Blaine urged the
former vice-president to remind the loggers of Penobscot
County that Chamberlain, Poor’s disciple, had supported the
Reciprocity Treaty. Chamberlain had no chance in the State
Legislature, which was heavily influenced by the lumberman’s
lobby.18
Shipbuilders were also opposed to reciprocity. Blaine and
Frederick A. Pike, Blaine’s Republican colleague in the House
of Representatives, argued that Maine’s shipbuilders needed
tariff protection.19 Actually, competition from British-built
ships was only one of a number of problems besetting Ameri
can builders. Pike came from Calais on the St. Croix, where
shipbuilding had been in decline since 1858, a year before
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reciprocity went into effect. The hardships facing Maine’s
shipbuilding industry are more directly attributable to re
placement of sail and wood by steam and iron, to overproduc
tion, to investment in railroads which soaked up available
capital, and to a shortage of select timber.20 Yet in the 1860s
competition from Canada-built ships appeared to be the
immediate danger.
There is evidence that from 1860 onward prominent Maine
politicians from outside Portland, whether Republican or
Democrat, believed that reciprocity was more beneficial to
British North America than to the United States. Wyman B. S.
Moor, a Democrat from Waterville who had served four terms
as attorney-general of Maine and briefly as United States Sena
tor, was consul general in Montreal during the Buchanan
presidency.21 In that capacity he put national interests ahead of
local interests. T he Grand Trunk Railway, which ran from the
St. Clair River across from Michigan through Montreal to
Portland, he argued, was attracting domestic American traffic
that properly belonged to American railroads.22 In Maine, the
State Legislature petitioned the national government to abro
gate the Reciprocity Treaty as quickly as possible. “The great
interests of this state,” theresolution noted, “ ... are injuriously
affected by the present treaty.”23 The follow ing year, Governor
Abner Coburn lauded that action and endorsed the legislature’s
recommendation.24
Another factor that made abrogation politically accepta
ble was anglophobia, particularly in Bangor, at that time the
state’s second largest urban center. According to Edward Chase,
Bangor’s residents remained embittered by memories of the
Aroostook War and the ensuing Webster-Ashburton Treaty,
whereby lands which they thought had been Maine’s were
declared part of New Brunswick. Ostensibly, Bangor supported
an eastward extension of the European and North American
Railroad only because it would assist in the defense of the
northeastern boundary.
A nglophobia was rife during and after the Civil War.
Newspaper sentiment in Maine and elsewhere intimated that
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The Grand T runk terminal, alongside towering grain elevators, symbolized
the im portance of Canadian produce shipm ents for Portland’s commercial
economy. Despite Portland's strong ties to the northern country, most Maine
politicians refused to support the Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty in
1866. MSH photo.

British business interests were behind the rapid growth of the
Confederate navy, which harassed Union shipping, increased
shipping costs, and threatened lives. Maine, an important
shipping and shipbuilding state, suffered disproportionately.25
The Portland Daily Advertiser and the Bangor Daily Whig and
Courier, which had supported the Reciprocity Treaty in 1854,
criticized British and Canadian behavior after the outbreak of
the war.26 In 1861 the Advertiser concluded that “the past
friendship of England has been mere pretense,” and warned
that “thousands of her people hail with delight the prospect of
our destruction.” The editor called for greater defense expendi
tures along the northern border.27 Democratic papers — Port
land’s Eastern A rgus and The Age of Augusta — endorsed the
USS San Jacinto’s seizure of Confederate commissioners James
M. Mason and John Slidell, bound for England aboard the
British steamer Trent, 28 The Republican Kennebec Journal
agreed that the incident had been in accordance with interna
tional law, and suggested that the elitist British government
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was consistent in supporting the Confederacy rather than the
more democratic U nion.29 The Lew iston Evening Journal
expressed similar sentiments, and the Aroostook Times, pub
lished at H oulton near the New Brunswick border, accused
Great Britain and France of show ing repeated partiality to the
“pirates of Jeff Davis.”30
Maine’s politicians responded sharply to British protests
over the Trent affair. In his annual message in January 1862,
Governor Israel Washburn again called for greater defense
expenditures for Portland, citing the British threat. Portland
was, said Washburn, “at once the Quebec and Halifax of the
United States.”31 Also concerned about his state’s inland boun
daries, Washburn recalled that the 1842 Webster-Ashburton
Treaty surrendered land along the northern border that facili
tated the movement of British troops from Saint John to the St.
Lawrence Valley. Many residents of British North America on
the other side of that long boundary, he regretted, were hostile
to the United States.32 In March 1864, the State Legislature
asked the federal government “to provide proper defences for
the northeastern frontier of Maine.”33
The St. Albans raid of November 1864 and the acquittal of
the involved Confederate querrillas seemed to confirm British
North American hostility to northerners. The raid and other
incidents portrayed British North Americans as either indiffer
ent to the safety of northern U. S. citizens or outright collabora
tors in Confederate hostilities. When the Fenian raids took
place in 1866, there was some smug satisfaction that the British
North Americans were receiving a taste of their own medi
cine.34 The British record during the Civil War added pressure
throughout the United States for the abrogation of reciproc
ity.35 Maine, exposed to southern raiders along its extensive
coastline and to supposed British designs along its border with
Canada, endorsed the national trend.
I n his annual message to the Maine Legislature, delivered
January 5, 1865 — barely two months after the St. Albans raid
— Governor Samuel Cony, a Democrat from Augusta, noted
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with satisfaction that President Abraham Lincoln had recom
mended the abrogation of reciprocity. Maine’s lumbering and
agricultural interests had suffered, the governor said.36 Fewer
than three weeks later, on January 23, the State Legislature
endorsed the president’s recommendation by approving a reso
lution that Maine’s senators and representatives in Washing
ton do what they could to hasten abrogation.37
Before the end of January, Congress passed enabling legis
lation for the abrogation of reciprocity. House Resolution 56
authorized President Lincoln “to give the requisite notice for
terminating the treaty. ’’ Four of Maine’s five representatives —
James G. Blaine, Sidney Perham, Frederick A. Pike, and John
H. Rice — were am ong the eighty-five yeas. The fifth, John
Lynch of the First Congressional District, which included
Portland, was out of the House at the time of the vote.38 A
majority of thirty-three senators voted for abrogation, while
eight voted against, and eight abstained.39 Both of Maine’s
senators, Nathan A. Farwell and Lot M. Morrill, expressed
opposition to reciprocity. Farwell cited the need to protect jobs
in the match industry within Maine, and sought to discourage
imports from British North America.40 Morrill found reciproc
ity incompatible with “the interests of my State, with one or
two exceptions .... ” He minimized the benefits to fishermen
and argued that the Portland-Montreal rail line would survive
abrogation.41
During the debate over abrogation, Portland’s own politi
cians had every opportunity to make their voices heard, but
they remained curiously silent on the issue. Representative
James G. Blaine, although a resident of Augusta, had been
editor of the Portland Daily Advertiser, and no doubt knew his
readership’s political inclinations. A recent biographer, H.
Otis Noyes, suggests that Blaine opposed reciprocity for ideo
logical and personal reasons: he was an anglophobe and owned
coal fields in Pennsylvania.42 Yet Noyes also points out that
“Blaine never blazed a trail, or moved far ahead of his consti
tuency. For him, no issue could be worth a crusade against the
odds.”43 Blaine, in short, responded to a perceived consensus
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within the Maine electorate, including, no doubt, his Portland
Daily Advertiser readers.
Portland’s own William Pitt Fessenden, senator from
Maine and Lincoln's secretary of the treasury from July 1864
until March 1865, was no outspoken advocate of reciprocity. As
a freshman senator in 1854 Fessenden had voted in favor of the
Reciprocity Treaty on the grounds that it would be beneficial
to Maine’s shipbuilding industry.44 Yet as secretary of the
treasury he was in a position to make his opinion heard in the
White House, and although he was at odds with Blaine on
many other issues, he made no effort to oppose Blaine on
abrogation.45 If he disagreed with presidential policy on the
matter, he kept his views to himself. The secretary, according to
one historian, “supported the restrictions of Seward, putting
the nation ahead of his home city.’’46
The lack of strong support for reciprocity in Portland
itself seems incongruous with the city’s earlier bid for continen
tal economic integration. Yet Portlanders were complacent.
While John Lynch of the First Congressional District absented
himself from the vote and Fessenden maintained his peace,
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others felt confident that the railroad industry would thrive
even without reciprocity.
Actually, determining the impact of reciprocity on Port
land’s rail traffic was not a simple matter in 1865-1866. The
Reciprocity Treaty in fact had little direct effect on Portland’s
railroad transportation, for as early as 1845, before construction
of the Atlantic and St. Lawrence had even begun, the United
States Congress had passed legislation that allowed goods
shipped to and from British North America to cross U. S.
territory free of duty. That, combined with Great Britain’s
repeal of the Corn Laws the follow ing year, had been stimulus
enough for construction of the railroad, which became opera
tional roughly a year before negotiation and implementation
of the treaty. Duty-free trade entering Portland itself under
reciprocal agreements accounted for only a small part of Port
land’s total commerce. In fiscal year 1865, total imports at
Portland were valued at $7,261,324. Between July 1, 1865, and
the end of Reciprocity on March 17, 1866, Falmouth and Port
land combined actually imported only $144,850 in goods
under the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty.47 This trade consti
tuted less than 2 percent of the total volume of Portland’s
commerce, although the treaty was in effect for almost 80
percent of the fiscal year.
But abrogation would have much more important long
term effects on Portland. The political alternatives to reciproc
ity were under discussion in Ottawa even while Maine con
gressmen were lobbying for abrogation in Washington. On
February 8, 1865, w hile American politicians were going
through the last stages of debate over abrogation, George
Brown, a leading Liberal from Canada West (now Ontario),
suggested on the floor of Canada’s Legislative Assembly that
more than reciprocity was at stake. He warned that Canadian
bonding privileges at Portland — or anywhere else in the
United States — m ight also be insecure.48 Brown and others
thought that if residents of the St. Lawrence Valley and of
Canada West wanted year-round access to the Atlantic, they
ought to build rail lines to Saint John and H alifax via a route
entirely within British North America.
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In fact, some Portland leaders seemed to appreciate what
this meant for the city’s carrying trade. When New Brunswick
elected a governm ent opposed to confederation in 1865,
Portland’s Eastern Argus was delighted. Without New Bruns
wick, confederation would not take place; without confedera
tion, there would be no all-Canadian railroad.49 Nevertheless,
confederation of four British North American provinces fol
lowed two years later, and construction of such a railroad was
one of the terms of the agreement. The all-Canadian Interco
lonial Railway was operational by 1876, and before the end of
the century a second Canadian line, the Canadian Pacific
Railway, was carrying traffic across the north of Maine from
Montreal to Saint John.
In the years before abrogation, however, the possibility of a
com peting all-Canadian rail line probably did not loom
large in Maine. Portland considered itself a key piece in the
Canadian transportation system, and city leaders could not
foresee the development of the Canadian Pacific Railway or the
influence which politicians from Saint John would have in
Ottawa, both to lure federal funds to develop their port and to
persuade the Canadian government to direct the CPR toward
Saint John, rather than Portland. That Portlanders could m in
imize the consequences of abrogation, Confederation, and an
all-Canadian railway is evident from the fact that even after
Confederation, and indeed after construction of the Intercolon
ial Railway had begun, Portland businessmen continued to
pursue their strategy of rail links between Maine and Canada.
The European and North American Railroad, which con
nected Portland, Bangor, and Saint John in 1871, involved a
major grant of state lands and heavy loans from the state and
the city of Bangor.50 T he sacrifice of the state’s last remaining
public lands was predicated on the assumption that allCanadian rail links to the Atlantic would not appreciably affect
trade flows through Maine. During the promotional cam
paigns of the late 1860s, Maine politicians had been easily
convinced that the publicly financed Intercolonial would never
be an economically viable alternative to Portland’s harbor.
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Indeed, extensive traffic to and from Montreal was still
passing through Portland at the turn of the century. By then,
however, Portland’s commercial position as Canada’s winter
port, as historian Robert Babcock pointed out in a recent arti
cle, clearly showed the effects of competition frdm Saint John.
Babcock indicates that to some extent Portland’s situation was
due to a self-conscious shift from commerce and industry to
tourism as a mainstay of the local economy.50 Certainly Port
land’s decline as a port cannot be attributed to abrogation
alone, but just as certainly renewed tariff wars and the push for
an all-Canada transportation system had a marked impact on
Portland’s trade.
The inconsistencies in Maine thinking about reciprocity
reflect inconsistencies in a statewide vision of the future in the
mid-nineteenth centufy. Portland merchants apparently mis
read the connection between reciprocity and their view of Port
land’s role in continental economic integration. Bangor lum
bermen, still firm in their conviction that forest-related
industries were the key to Maine’s future, were united in their
opposition to continental economic integration. Although
some support for reciprocity came from sectors outside Port
land, M aine’s extensive resource-based industries chafed
under free trade policies giving Canada access to U. S. markets.
There were good reasons for thinking that reciprocity was
beneficial, politically and economically. The city of Portland,
the railroad industry, consumers of coal and other raw prod
ucts, shipbuilders, fishermen, and perhaps even the lumber
industry in the St. John and St. Croix valleys all had something
to gain from it. Other interests, particularly Bangor’s lumber
industry, opposed reciprocity. Why Bangor’s views prevailed
over Portland’s vision of Maine’s future is more than an eco
nomic question. It involved the role of the British North Amer
ican provinces in the Civil War, Portland’s perception that it
could survive, even thrive, despite abrogation and Confedera
tion, and the particular complexion of economic and political
forces within the state at mid-century. Within Maine, oppo
nents of reciprocity were more forceful than supporters, and
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despite differences of population, the perceived interests of
Bangor took priority over the perceived interests of Portland.
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